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By late May 1864,

tlie Army of the
Potomac resembled
a wagon with the
whe81s coming oft.

Since May 4, when the army had crossed the Rapidan River and
begun what would become known as the Overland Campaign, it
had faced an incessant strain of day-after-day combat-in the Wilderness, at Spotsylvania Court House, at the North Anna River, and
in a dozen smaller brushfires in between. The relentless pace had
brought the Army of the Potomac to what its commanding general,
Major General George Gordon Meade, believed was the end of its
tether. "I don't believe the military history of the world can offer
a parallel to the protracted and severe fighting which this army
has sustained for the last thirty days," Meade complained, and he
feared that "with all this severe fighting .. . the physical powers of
the men would be exhausted." But Meade had little choice but to
slog onward. Although he was still, by title, in charge of the army,
he was taking direction from Lieutenant General Ulysses Simpson
Grant, the overall general of all Union armies, and Grant was determined "to fight it out on this line," from the Rapidan to the Confederate capital of Richmond, "if it takes all summer."!
So far, it looked like it would take far beyond summer. Over the
course of May's campaigning, the Army of the Potomac had lost a
stomach-sinking total of 40,000 men out of action. And it would
soon lose more without firing a shot, as 34 of the army's three-year
regiments were due to see their enlistments expire in June. Historian John Cadman Ropes estimated that "exclusive of worthless
bounty-jumpers and such trash," Grant had "only about 65,000 veteran infantry in the three corps," an advantage of less than 10,000
over his Confederate foe Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia.2 To make up the shortfall, Grant raided the District
of Columbia's garrison for another 33,000 men- although half of
them were in huge heavy-artillery regiments and had never done
anything more in the way of war than guard the intricate string of
Washington's fortifications and pose heroically for photographers.
On the other hand, the Army of Northern Virginia had also
been severely ground down. James Longstreet, commander of
the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia and Lee's "old
war-horse," had been wounded by mistaken Confederate bullets
in the Wilderness; Richard Ewell, another corps commander, had
suffered a near-complete breakdown at Spotsylvania.3 Lee found
replacements-Richard Heron Anderson for Longstreet and Jubal
Early for Ewell-but neither Anderson nor Early would ever shine
as great subordinates. And, like Grant, Lee would fill the gaps in
the ranks only by stripping elsewhere, including the Richmond
defenses of Robert F. Hoke's division and the Shenandoah Valley
of John C. Breckinridge's division, and recalling the division commanded by the unreliable George Pickett from semi-exile in North
Carolina. Above all, Lee could not repair the damage a month's
savage fighting had done to the northern Virginia countryside,
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which he would need to feed his army. "There are no crops worth
speaking of," reported one Yankee colonel. "The country is one vast
graveyard-graves everywhere, marking the track of the army on
the march and in battles."4

military point of view, Grant's greatest frustration on this campaign had been geography. The rivers of northern Virginia-the Rapidan,
North Anna, and Pamunkey-ran west-east, and Lee
attempted to make the most of their obstacles. Bitter fighting had
taken place along all these rivers in May, and even if Grant could
get across the Pamunkey without another costly fight, he would
face Totopotomy Creek and then the Chickahominy River.
But surprisingly, the movements across the Pamunkey and
the Totopotomy proved the easiest of the entire campaign. On May
27, the Army of the Potomac crossed the Pamunkey with two divisions of Phil Sheridan's cavalry and the VI Corps (under Horatio
Wright) at Dabney's Ferry.s Winfield Hancock's II Corps followed
the VI, while the army's remaining two infantry corps, Gouverneur
K. Warren's V Corps and Ambrose Burnside's IX Corps, crossed
farther downstream at Newcastle Ferry. Grant also detached the
XVIII Corps under William Farrar "Baldy" Smith from the stalled
Union expedition on Bermuda Hundred, and brought them up to
the York River, where they could disembark and extend the Union
reach still farther, to the Totopotomy.
Lee's response to this threat was curiously sluggish, and Grant
took this as a sign that the long month of campaigning was finally
wearing down the Army of Virginia. Despite the horrendous Union
casualties, Grant convinced himself that "Lee's army is really
whipped.... I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's
army is already assured."G On May 30, Grant extended the first elements of the Army of the Potomac over the Totopotomy, beginning
with Warren's V Corps and a division of Sheridan's cavalry, pushing all
the way down to the crossroads of Old Cold Harbor, only a mile and a
half above the Chickahominy and less than 10 miles from Richmond.

D

From a strir.t

odd name Cold Harbor has long been
a puzzlement, since the village was neither a harbor nor, in the
chalky-dry summer of 1864, anything like cold. But the name's
genealogy stretches back to Roman Britain, where a col herbergh
was an unfortified guard post along the Roman-built roads. John
Stow's celebrated survey of the cities of London and Westminster
names the Lord Mayor's mansion as "Cold Harbour," and it was not
difficult for Shropshire antiquarian Charles Henry Hartshorne to
find over 70 Cold Harbors in northern England alone in 1841. 7
Whatever the romantic origins of its name, the Cold Harbor
in the Army of the Potomac's path consisted of little more than
a tavern, a collection of buildings, and a crossroads. Seizing and
holding the area would force Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia into a fast shuffle, giving Grant the opportunity to knock the
Confederates apart with an attack. Grant could, in that case, "crush
Lee's army on the north side of the James, with the prospect in case
of success of driving him into Richmond, capturing the city perhaps without a siege, and putting the Confederate government to
flight." Politics contributed another behind-the-scenes motive. The
Republican National Convention was due to assemble in Baltimore
on June 7 to renominate Abraham Lincoln for the presidency. If
Grant could deliver a significant victory on the eve of the conven-

THE ETYMOLOGY OF THE

Union s oldiers forage through a p otato field along the
banks of the Pamunkey as eleme nts of the VI Corps
cross the river on a pontoon bridge during the Army of
the P otomac's southward m ove in late May 1864.
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tion, it would enhance Lincoln's nomination and silence Radical
Republican dissidents, who were already assembling their own
rival convention in Cleveland to nominate John C. Fremont.s
At first, this was exactly how the scene promised to play. Two
Union cavalry divisions arrived at the Cold Harbor crossroads
on May 31, clearing out a "slight force of [Confederate] cavalry."
Alarmed, Lee at once tried to recover the crossroads by dispatching
an entire division of Confederate cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee and
diverting Robert Hoke's newly arrived infantry division; Richard
Heron Anderson's corps would follow as fast as they could march.
But neither Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry nor the first infantry brigades
to get on the ground-Lawrence Keitt's South Carolina brigade and
Thomas Lanier Clingman's North Carolinians-were able to dislodge Federal troopers armed with repeating carbines.9
Now began a race to get infantry to Cold Harbor, and Grant
looked to be in the lead. Horatio Wright's VI Corps was already in
motion after midnight on May 31, and William F. Smith's XVIII
Corps had just debarked from its transports and moved down to
the Totopotomy, with orders from Grant to push on to Cold Harbor.
Sliding down behind them, the II Corps and V Corps would link up
with the VI Corps and XVIII Corps and form a protective, west-facing shield a half-mile west of the Cold Harbor crossroads.
Wright and the advance guard of the VI Corps arrived at Cold
Harbor on June 1 to the delirious cheers of the Yankee cavalry and a
band "out on the skirmish line playing 'Hail Columbia."' The problem was that this arrival did not occur until 9 a.m. Charles Dana,
the assistant secretary of war, was traveling with the army, and
coldly noted Wright's lack of energy. "Instead of having his advance
there at 9 a.m.," Dana tattled furiously to Secretary of War Edwin
Stanton, "it was General Grant's and Meade's design that his whole
corps should be on the ground at daylight, when a rapid attack in
mass would certainly have routed the rebel forces." Worse still, it
was not until noon that the bulk of the VI Corps was fully in place,
"getting into line of battle and digging rifle pits all along the line"
west of Cold Harbor. Baldy Smith and the XVIII Corps had been
given wrong directions by a staff officer, and didn't appear until

Delays in the attack of the Union VI and xvm Corps on June I allowed
Confederate troops at Cold Harbor to erect hasty, but effective, breastworks.
BELOW: XVIU Corps commander William F. Smith (seated) and his
staff in June 1864. ABOVE: Part of the Rebel defenses at Cold Harbor.

"about 3 p .m., after a march of more than twentyfive miles."IO
Nevertheless, Wright and Smith had preemptory orders from Meade to move to the attack.
"General Wright is ordered to attack as soon as his
troops are up," Meade wrote to Smith at noon, "and
I desire you should co-operate with him and join in
the attack." Just by the numbers, Wright and Smith
should have been more than sufficient for the task;
together, they could mass six divisions-between
25,000 and 30,000 men-and even though it took
another three hours to get "into position a little to
the west of the old tavern, at Cold Harbor Cross
Roads," by 6 p.m., the two Federal corps "were
formed in four lines of battle, by regiments," and
ready to advance to the attack.ll
But the delay gave the Confederates time
to entrench, a recurring course of events on the
campaign, and one that usually had fatal consequences for Federal attackers. Hoke's division,
with its four brigades, had been joined by Breckinridge, and then by Joseph B. Kershaw's division
(from Anderson's corps) and Harry Heth's division (from A.P. Hill's corps), and together they
had dug themselves into defenses along a string
of hills and ridges perpendicular to Cold Harbor
Road, just west of the crossroads. The entrenchments were something less than a marvel of engineering. The terrain was cut sharply by ravines,
gullies, and streams, and Thomas Clingman
(whose North Carolina brigade held the first section of the line stretching northward from Cold
Harbor Road) was bothered by a gap "of about
seventy-five yards" made by a stream that ran
between his left flank and the next Confederate
brigade, William T. Wofford's, in Kershaw's division. There was at least enough time to create
an abatis of cut pine trees, "interlocking with
each other and barring all farther advance." That
would have to do.l2
Sometime before 6 p.m., with "the sun ... less
than an hour high," both Wright's and Smith's
corps "almost simultaneously" advanced "to the
To view this article's reference notes, turn
to our Notes section on page 78.

THE BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR

I COLD HARBOR , VIRGINIA I

Determined to defeat Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and take Richmond, Ulysses S. Grant advanced the Army of
the Potomac southward in May 1864, looking for a fight. After clashing with Lee in a series of bloody but indecisive battles,
including at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House, Grant launched another attack at Cold Harbor. a tiny crossroads
town less than 10 miles from the Confederate capital. On June 1, Union forces repeatedly assaulted Lee's outnumbered but wellentrenched Confederates. but to no avail. The same result awaited the Union troops who renewed the attack two days later.
By the time Grant finally called a halt to the operations on June 3, over 13,000 of his men were dead, wounded, or missing.
Grant would later admit he regretted the assault at Cold Harbor "more than any one I have ever ordered."

·~ =
U.=
NEILL
.

June 3 Attac

MEADE
ARMY of the POTOMAC

i

~

'
· .J

LEE
ARMY of N. VIRGINIA

49
THE CIVIL WAR MONITOR
SUMMER 2014

Men of Brigadier General Jan1es Ricketts' VI Corps division advance to assault an entrenched
Confederate position during the fighting of June 1. The attack, which pierced the Rebel line, was
one of the day's few successes for Union forces.

charge, a dash by more than 25,000 men." Smith's XVIII Corps
went into the attack "in battalions in column closed in mass," trying
to spear their way through the Confederate defenses. A soldier in
the 25th Massachusetts Infantry saw that "they had entered the
opening of a valley shaped iike a horse-shoe, and that the land rose
in front and on either flank, covered with wood and brush, s o that"
even in their hastily contrived "line of rifle-pits and a low breastwork of logs and rails," the Confederate fire was too heavy to stand.
Once they had overrun the outer skirmish line, the men of the
XVIII Corps "were at the mercy of a concealed enemy," and began
to fall back."I3
In front of the VI Corps, the going was even tougher. One of
David Russell's brigades, commanded by the newly promoted
Emory Upton, had been reinforced by the 2nd Connecticut Heavy
Artillery, one of the units Grant had fished from the Washington
fortifications. The unbloodied "heavies" counted an unwieldy 1,800
men in line (heavy artillery regiments had to maintain both an artillery and an infantry component), and they were more than twice
as big as the entire rest of Upton's brigade (the 5th Maine, 95th
and 96th Pennsylvania, and Upton's own I 21st New York). In their
unfaded uniforms, brass shoulder scales, and red-pipedjackets,
they endured endless jibes as "fresh duck" and "pets of the War
Department." Cold Harbor offered them their first opportunity to

prove themselves.I4
Emory Upton was only too happy to oblige.
He formed up his brigade in four lines: three battalions of the 2nd Connecticut (with four companies in each battalion line) and the rest of the
brigade in the fourth line. Their colonel, Elisha
Kellogg, led from in front, wearing a straw hat
and aiming directly at Thomas Clingman's North
Carolina brigade, 400 yards away. They brushed
through the outlying Confederate skirmish line,
crossed an open field, then spilled down into a
ravine and up the far side, where Clingman's
main line was waiting for them. "A sheet of flame,
sudden as lightning, red as blood, and so near it
seemed to singe the men's faces, burst along the
rebel breastworks," wrote the adjutant of the 2nd
Connecticut, Thomas Vaill. "The air was filled
with sulphurous smoke, and the shrieks and
howls of almost two hundred and fifty mangled
men, rose above the yells of the triumphant
rebels." In the rear rank of the Union attack, a
soldier in the 121st New York could see the Connecticut "heavies" collapse "in all shapes. Some
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Yet the June 1 attack was not entirely unsuccessful. Although
Upton's brigade was stalled and pinned down, it did not retreat.
Andjust as Thomas Clingman had feared, when James Ricketts' VI
Corps division hit the gap between Clingman's line and Kershaw's
division, one of Ricketts' brigades broke through, flinging William
Wofford's Georgia brigade backward in panic. The brigade "carried the works in its front and captured several hundred prisoners,
who were taken to the rear," then "notwithstanding the difficulties encountered in a dense thicket and swamp," they forced both
Hoke's and Kershaw's divisions to abandon their entrenchments
and pull back a quarter-mile to a new lineP
gave Lee space to move more of
Anderson's and A.P. Hill's brigades down to the hastily redrawn
Cold Harbor defenses. He could be grateful that on June 2,
the weather, which had been sand-dry through May, suddenly
clouded over and brought on a "deluge of rain." Meade and Grant
had seen just enough success so far that (as they had done at
Spotsylvania) they decided to try another attack, this time adding
Warren's V Corps and Hancock's II Corps to make the blow at
Cold Harbor an overwhelming one. Grant's intention, Horace
Porter recalled, "was to attack early in the morning ... push it
vigorously, and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point
from wherever they can be taken." But getting Hancock's corps
to Cold Harbor proved no easier than getting Wright and the VI
Corps there the day before. Hancock denounced it as "the most
severe march of the campaign, marching ten and one-half hours
until June 2." The head of the old Irish Brigade only "reached Cold
Harbor at 6.30 a.m.," and even then was "in such an exhausted
condition that a little time was required to allow the men to collect
and to cook their rations." Reluctantly, Grant delayed any fresh
attack until 4 p.m. T hen down came the "tempest of wind and
rain." Hancock "was so earnest in opposition to" the idea of an
assault "that Meade countermanded the order," and set the attack
back to 4:30a.m. on June 3.1s
As Hancock and Warren arrived, Grant positioned Hancock's
corps on the left of the VI Corps, below Cold Harbor Road; Lee
promptly matched that by bringing up the balance of A.P. Hill's
corps, along with Breckinridge's division. He lined them up opposite
Hancock and set them to digging. All the Rebels needed was time,
and Hancock's tardiness and the afternoon downpour granted it.
"Both sides anticipated battle on the 3rd," wrote Confederate artilleryman Robert Stiles. But since the Confederates intended to fight
this battle on the defensive, they "set to work to rectify the lines
about this point." One of Anderson's brigadiers, Evander Mcivor
Law, actually "laid off the new line with his own hand and superintended the construction of it during the night of the 2d."I9
The rest of the Army of the Potomac knew how to read these
signs. As Horace Porter wandered along the lines, observing the
"preparations for the next morning's assault, I noticed that many
of the soldiers had taken off their coats and seemed to be engaged
in sewing up rents in them." At first, he thought this was a charming but puzzling effort to look one's best in a fight. "But upon closer
examination it was found that the men were calmly writing their
names and address on slips of paper, and pinning them on the
backs of their coats, so that their dead bodies might be recognized
upon the field, and their fate made known to their families at home.
They were veterans who knew well from terrible experience the
danger which awaited them ...." 20

THE COMING OF DARKNESS

would fall forward as if they had caught their feet
and tripped and fell. Others would throw up their
arms and fall backward. Others would stagger
about a few paces before they dropped."I5
Kellogg was still on his feet, and close enough
that Clingman noticed him and locked eyes for a
moment even as he gave the order to fire. Kellogg
took off his hat to cheer his men on, but Clingman's fire "knocked down the front ranks of the
column, while the oblique fire along the right and
left cut down men rapidly all along the column
towards the rear." Kellogg was shot in the arm,
and struggled to give the order to about-face
when he was hit in the head and fell dead "upon
the interlocking pine boughs" of the abatis. The
slaughter was so unnerving that Emory Upton,
whose horse had been shot from under him, actually stopped the second battalion of the "heavies"
from going in and ordered them to lie down, then
recruited a squad of marksmen to join him in
picking off Confederate heads above the breastworks in order to dampen the Rebels' enthusiasm
for more firing.IG
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While showing initial promise in places, the attack by the Army of the Potomac's II Corps on June 3 ended in
disappointment. ABOVE: II Corps commander Winfield Scott Hancock (seated) is shown with his division commanders
(from left to right): Francis Barlow, David Birney, and John Gibbon. OPPOSITE PAGE: Men of the 7th New York Heavy
Artillery break through the Confederate lines on June 3 before being pushed back by a counterattack.

t
g, a single signal shot was
fired from the lOth Massachusetts battery. The first
light was "cloudy and foggy," and the rain was "still
pattering in fitful showers." In the "blinding mist,"
Union officers could barely discern on the south side of the road an
"intrenched line of the enemy ... on a low hill that was quite long,
ending ... on the Chickahominy swamps, making it quite impossible
to turn the position w ithout crossing the river." Against this ground,
Grant proposed to throw all three divisions of Hancock's II Corps,
storming against the Confederate entrenchments south of Cold
Harbor Road; north of it, Wright and Baldy Smith would renew
the attacks the VI and XVIII Corps had made two days before.
"The tactical movement was very simple," wrote Charles Porter
of the 39th Massachusetts. "Each corps commander was to form
his corps as he might determine, a grand rush was to be made, and
great were the hopes that success would crown our arms." 21
Hancock formed his corps with the divisions of Francis Barlow
and John Gibbon in front, and David Birney's division in reserve,
ready to exploit any opening. Barlow, in turn, formed his four brigades into two waves, and as the Federal artillery erupted with a
barrage "heavy and incessant" enough to awaken Richmonders
"from their slumbers," his two lead brigades sprang forward,
headed for the trenches held by John Breckinridge's small division.
Double-quicking, and "without firing a shot," Barlow's men overran the Confederate picket line, crossed over a sunken road at the

D
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base of the long hill occupied by the Rebels, "and
swept into the enemy's lines, capturing prisoners
and three pieces of artillery." There were no "artificial obstructions, such as abatis or 'slashings,'
to detain an assaulting column," and the 7th New
York Heavy Artillery, in John Brooke's brigade,
snatched the regimental flag of Breckinridge's
26th Virginia Battalion.22
But the going was less easy farther northward. In John Gibbon's division, the 155th New
York made a rapid advance to "within So yards of
the enemy's works." But the hill was steeper here,
and the "sunken road" in the ravine deeper, and
in the face of "the heavy fire from the enemy's
breastworks, it was impossible for the regiment
to gain the works." After 30 minutes of pointless punishment, the New Yorkers began inching backward, until, "at about 150 yards from the
enemy's line the regiment halted and established
a new line .. . by using fenc e rails and throwing up
earth with bayonets and tin cups." Soon enough,
even Barlow's headlong attack lost its momentum. The n6th Pennsylvania "succeeded in gaining the main works of the enemy ... but they were
soon forced out by the heavily reinforced Con-

federates." They "fell back ... about seventy-five
yards from the enemy's line and quickly covered
themselves with rifle pits or took advantage of
such shelter as the broken ground afforded."23
Eventually, Barlow's men, too, began to wilt
under Confederate counterattacks, clambering
out of "the captured works" and fleeing "wildly
for the protection of ... the Union guns." In all,
"twenty minutes had not passed since the infantry had sprung to their feet," and now the "dazed
and utterly discouraged" survivors "drifted off
... and found their regiments, but some of them
drifted to the rear and to coffee pots."24
Still, the failure of Hancock's attack was less
dismal than the result that awaited Wright and
Smith on the north side of Cold Harbor Road.
"About sunrise here they came," wrote William McClendon of the 15th Alabama, "charging
through the pine thicket, huzzaing as they came,
expecting to run over and capture all that were in
the breast-works." Smith's XVIII Corps jumped
to their attack in close column, "ten lines deep,
with arms at a trail," and so closely packed that
"it was hardly possible for a ball to pass through
without hitting some one .... I never in all the
bloody conflicts that I have been in saw such
destruction of human lives. They literally piled
on top of one another, often the dead would hold
down the wounded and vice versa." Griffin Stedman's brigade was stacked in column of regiments, with the 12th New Hampshire first, then
the nth Connecticut, 8th Maine, and 2nd New
Hampshire. The 12th took the brunt of the fire,
the men (according to Sergeant John L. Piper)
bending over "as they pushed forward, as if
trying .. . to breast a tempest, and the files of men
went down like rows of blocks or bricks pushed
over by striking against one another." Another
sergeant, Jacob Tuttle, saw so many of his men
drop to the ground at once that he thought he had
missed an order to lie down. He was wrong. Most
of his company had been killed outright, and he
"dropped ... among the dead, and did not discover my mistake until my living comrades had
advanced some distance beyond me."25
The Confederates who opposed them could

scarcely believe the easy targets the Yankee attackers offered. "The
excitement ran so high ... that the surgeon of the regiment quit
his litter corps and was in the line firing before I discovered him,"
marveled one Confederate, while "the officers, with hats in hands,
went up and down the line, feeling so much elated that they would
strike the men over the heads and faces and shout with all the joy
ever expressed at a camp-meeting by a new convert." The Alabama
brigadier, Mcivor Law, "found the men in fine spirits, laughing and
talking as they fired .... I had seen nothing to exceed this. It was not
war; it was murder." Or even worse, massacre. William Oates, commanding the 15th Alabama in Law's brigade, saw the 25th Massachusetts barreling toward him "in a column by divisions, thus presenting a front of two companies only." The Alabamians opened up
"the most destructive fire I ever saw.... I could see the dust fog out
of a man's clothing in two or three places at once where as many
balls would strike him at the same moment. In two minutes not a
man of them was standing. 26
At some point, the havoc ceased to make sense even to the
Confederates who were wreaking it. In front of Law's Alabama brigade, a Union regiment had been "so roughly handled" that most
of its survivors had fallen back without orders-except their color
sergeant who, oblivious of his abandonment, "steadily advanced,
solitary and alone, proudly bearing his flag." Not even Law's hardnosed veterans could stand shooting the man, and instead began
waving their arms and yelling, "Go back! Go back! We'll kill you!"
When his peril finally dawned on him, the Yankee sergeant stopped,
lifted his flag from its socket, and looked anxiously and deliberately
"first to the right rear, and then his left rear." Then "with the same
moderation gathered in the flag, right-shoulder-shifted his charge,
came to and about-faced as deliberately, and walked back amid the
cheers of Law's men."27
The mood was less generous among the battered survivors of
the VI and XVIII Corps. Orders "to renew the attack without reference to the troops on the right or left" were issued, conveyed, and
passed down "through the wonted channels; but no man stirred,
and the immobile lines pronounced a verdict, silent yet emphatic,
against further slaughter." In Stedman's brigade, one captain "stood
up before his superiors in rank" and "declared with an oath that
he would not take his regiment into another such charge, if Jesus
Christ himself should order it." Baldy Smith was more succinct:
"I received a verbal order from General Meade to make another
assault, and that order I refused to obey."2S

The a
n a mo
o June 3lasted barely an
hour. All operations had practically halted by 11 a.m.,
and at 12:30 p.m., Grant advised Meade that "The
opinion of the corps commanders not being sanguine
of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advanced for the present." There was desultory
fighting farther northward at Bethesda Church, and in the evening, A.P. Hill's Confederates attempted a short-lived counterattack
below Cold Harbor Road to clear what small advances the Yankees
had made there in the morning. But Federal artillery vengefully
"opened with shell, case, and solid shot," leaving "the rebel line back
broken and shattered" and "leaving their dead and part of their
wounded on the field."29
This was small consolation to Grant, who had hoped to deliver
a fatal military blow to the Army of Northern Vir,... l CONT. ON P. 74
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DISUNION
CONTINUED FROM P. 23

the very nature of freedom was being
questioned and the bonds ofrestricted
servitude were being broken, and
when the unfulfilled promise that "all
men are created equal" was tentatively held out to an expectant generation of American women who, almost
20 years earlier at Seneca Falls, had

inscribed their gender onto Thomas
Jefferson's ringing prose.
It would be many years before
their sisters-in-arms would reap the
benefit of their fledgling feminist
agitation-in a world where the word
"feminist" did not even exist. Like
many pioneers, they sowed the seeds
that they would not live to see burst
into flower. Q
JEAN R. FREEDMAN TEACHES
HISTORY AND WOMEN 'S STUDIES
AT MONTGOMERY COLLEGE.

CONTINUED FROM P. 27

CONTINUED FROM P. 29

trophies of a very small victory culled
from a much larger, bloodier defeat. 3
Since the turn of the 20th century,
multiple renditions ofthis story have
been circulated, each with a varying
explanation as to who exactly killed
Skaggs and, perhaps more interestingly, who began the process of mutilation. Regardless of storyteller, though,
one element remained constant: The
tactics of terror so gleefully employed
by Larkin Skaggs were turned on him
wholesale. By the aftemoon of August
21, 1863, the morning's most exultant
hunter had become the hunted. The
town's own carnival of the grotesque
had become a macabre kind of therapy.
And therein the cogs of irregular violence turned along the Missouri-Kansas border. Death spawned grief; grief
necessitated vengeance; and so, as
Larkin Skaggs discovered too late, the
cycle of violence kept rolling on. Cl

Creek, and several other battles
during the Civil War, proved is that
when soldiers are more interested in
the spoils of war than the fate of the
enemy, good tactical judgment and
discipline can easily disappear. Q
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ginia. With the Republican convention
so near at hand, he was unusually terse
in the notification he sent to Washington before the end of the day on
June 3. "We assaulted at 4.30 a.m. this
moming, driving the enemy within his
intrenchments at all points .... Our loss
was not severe." Suspiciously, Grant
refused to ask for the customary postbattle truce to recover the wounded
trapped between the armies. Tradition
dictated that the loser ask for the truce,
but Grant was unwilling to make such
an admission until5:30 p.m. on June 7,
by which time the Republican convention was already in full swing. 3D
To his staff, however, Grant freely
admitted that he had made a hideous

mistake. "I regret this assault more
than any one I have ever ordered ...
as it has proved, no advantages have
been gained sufficient to justify the
heavy losses suffered." He would eventually have to report-as an aggregate
of all the casualties from the cavalry
fight at the crossroads, the infantry
attacks on June 1 and 3, and the skirmishing that followed for the next
week-a depressing total of 13,153
killed, wounded, or missing from the
Army of the Potomac. Only a third of
these actually took place on the fatal
morning of June 3. But eventually the
futile assaults that morning came to
stand for the cluster of battles around
Cold Harbor, and the staggering total
of over 13,000 fixed itself in the public
mind for June 3 alone. 31
Cold Harbor would cling to Grant
like mud, sealing his image as an
unfeeling butcher whose primary strategic metaphor was a meat grinder.
For the Army of the Potomac, Cold
Harbor would remain a monument
to chances lost instead of seized. "It is
very interesting to revisit the battlefields of the war, but I never heard any
one who was engaged there express a
wish to see Cold Harbor again," wrote
a former VI Corps staffer after the war.
"It remains in memory the Golgotha of
American history."3 2 Q
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